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1. Introduction 
Concern about increasing income inequality in rich countries has become 
a common theme among commentators, politicians and international 
organisations, often focusing on the rising share going to the very top versus the 
“squeezed middle”. Polarisation of the wage distribution from hollowing out of 
the occupational structure has received a great deal of attention. Polarisation in 
the broader income distribution in terms of a shrinking share of households “in 
the middle” has also been studied, as has the extent to which the share of total 
income going to households around the middle has been falling (Wolfson, 1997; 
Deutsch and Silber, 2010). Polarisation or declining income shares for the middle 
could go together with rising living standards, but increasing inequality is seen 
by some to be a key cause of stagnating real incomes and living standards for the 
middle and lower parts of the distribution (Mishel et al., 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; 
Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio, 2010). This linkage is at the core of the recent 
focus on “inclusive growth” and “shared prosperity”, which has become a 
rallying-cry and central focus for the OECD and other multilateral organisations 
(Saunders, 2001; de Mello and Dutz, 2012; OECD, 2015).  
This paper uses data from the key comparative distributional data 
sources available for the rich countries from around 1980 through the Great 
Recession to investigate the extent to which increasing income inequality has in 
fact been associated with stagnating real incomes for the middle. Drawing on 
data across 29 rich countries from the Luxembourg Income Study, the OECD 
Income Distribution Database and the World Top Income Database, we examine 
how income inequality and real incomes around the middle have evolved over 
time, and the extent to which rising inequality appears to be associated with 
changes in real incomes. The experience of the United States over the past 30 
years – rapid rise in income inequality together with slow growth of middle 
incomes – has played a major role in influencing research and commentary on 
inequality, living standards and the “squeezed middle”. Here we able to put that 
experience in comparative context. The paper also brings out some important 
lessons about using the available data to analyse the relationship between 
inequality and living standards and how best to track and monitor “inclusive 
growth”.  
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The paper is structured along the following lines. We begin with a 
discussion on inequality and the squeezed middle and the channels by which 
inequality might impact on middle incomes. Section 3 describes the data on 
which we rely, covering most of the countries of the OECD. In Section 4 we look 
at how real incomes at the middle evolved over time for these countries, and 
whether this simply reflects differences in overall economic growth. We then 
examine trends in income inequality in Section 5, as measured by the Gini index 
and the share going to the very top of the income distribution. In Section 6 we 
investigate the extent to which stagnating real incomes and increasing inequality 
appear to be go together, and the role of economic growth. Section 7 presents the 
key findings and priorities for further analysis.  
 
2. Inequality and the “squeezed middle” 
While the notion that the middle has been squeezed as a result of 
increasing inequality is widespread, it is open to a variety of interpretations, 
depending on what one sees as “the middle” and what constitutes being 
“squeezed”. Economists investigating the squeezed middle have usually focused 
on those in the middle of the income distribution (Gornick and Jäntti, 2013), 
rather than those in the middle class in sociological terms (although a good deal 
of the popular discussion refers to the “middle class” in the latter sense, who 
would generally be higher up the income distribution). Being “squeezed” could 
refer to a shrinking proportion being located around the middle, which is what 
polarisation is usually taken to mean, or to those around the middle losing out in 
terms of their share in total income, each the focus of recent research (Alderson 
et al., 2005; Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2009; Foster and Wolfson, 
2010; D’Ambrosio, 2001; Bigot et al., 2011; Alderson and Doran, 2013; Atkinson 
and Brandolini, 2013; Autor and Dorn, 2013). In popular and political debate, 
however, the dominant concern has been that the middle has seen little or no 
improvement in living standards and overall prosperity over time. This concern 
goes beyond current real incomes, to include greater insecurity and vulnerability 
for the middle as well as poorer opportunities and prospects for their children 
(Nichols and Rehm, 2014; Hacker at al., 2013). But stagnating real incomes is 
central to the debate, particularly in the USA.  
 4 
Why would increasing income inequality give rise to such a “squeeze” on 
middle incomes? If the very top receives an ever-increasing share of total income 
then there must be a compensating decline in shares elsewhere. Nevertheless, an 
increase in top shares (in relative terms) could go together with rapidly rising 
real incomes throughout the distribution (in absolute terms).  
Indeed, the argument that higher inequality provides the incentives 
required to drive economic growth, from which the middle and lower parts of 
the income distribution benefit through greater increases over time in their real 
incomes, has been prominent in economic and political debate for many years. 
More recently, though, it is argued that increasing inequality may instead now be 
damaging to growth and middle incomes, through a complex variety of channels. 
These include fuelling household debt and real estate bubbles; reducing 
aggregate demand; undermining capital investment; reducing the capacity of 
middle and lower income households to invest in education and skills; 
reinforcing barriers to socio-economic mobility so more fail to reach their full 
productive potential; entrenching the power of existing elites to protect their 
economic interests including rent-seeking, increasing barriers to entry and 
stifling innovation; fuelling household debt and real estate bubbles; exacerbating 
pressures for protectionism and restriction of immigration; and undermining the 
political and legal institutions and social trust that are now recognised as key to 
growth. Such potentially important channels have featured in Stiglitz’s highly 
influential contributions (2012; 2015), in recent studies by the IMF and the 
OECD (Ostry et al., 2014; Cingano, 2014; OECD, 2015), and in financial sector 
commentary (Morgan Stanley, 2015; Standard and Poor’s, 2014). 
Seeking to identify whether such specific channels of influence have 
operated or been central to recent experience is extremely complex, not least 
due to the very different time periods over which they might operate, and is well 
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we are contributing the empirical basis 
on which this research can be carried out, our aim is to describe and assess 
overall trends and patterns in real incomes and income inequality over time 
across OECD countries and probe the extent to which they appear to be related. 
While this can only be suggestive as to underlying causal mechanisms and 
relationships, such an analysis does allow us to consider which of the competing 
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grand narratives that are central in current debates – that inequality contributes 
to rising prosperity for "ordinary" middle-income households or prevents it – is 
more consistent with the evidence from varying country experiences. 
 
3. The data 
3.1 Underlying micro datasets 
Our analysis of the evolution of incomes and their distribution is based 
primarily on the two sources that provide data on income in a standardised way 
across countries and time and that have featured prominently in seminal studies 
on inequality and poverty – namely, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
database (used for instance in Atkinson et al., 1995; Gornick and Jannti, 2013), 
and the OECD Income Distribution and Poverty database (used in OECD, 2008; 
2011; 2015). We briefly describe these datasets here; detailed information is 
provided on the relevant websites, and the LIS and OECD datasets have also been 
the subject of recent in-depth reviews by Ravallion (2015) and Gasparini and 
Tornarolli (2015) respectively. 
The LIS database allows the micro data to be accessed (remotely to 
safeguard confidentiality), so that inequality and poverty measures and income 
levels at different points in the distribution can be derived directly and 
consistently from the underlying data at the individual and household level. The 
OECD database, on the other hand, comprises a substantial set of such variables 
collected using a standardised questionnaire sent to member countries and filled 
out by them from national surveys.1 LIS has assembled data for most of the 
countries it covers in “waves” for occasional years around 1975, 1980, 1985 and 
so on, at approximately 5-year intervals. The OECD database also presents 5-
year interval data for the earlier period but contains a good deal of annual data 
for recent years. LIS allows one to go back as far as around 1980 for rather more 
countries than the OECD database, but the latter has information on New 
Zealand and Portugal which are not in LIS, as well as Japan for which LIS has data 
for only one year.  
As the LIS and OECD databases are each widely used in comparative 
research, we draw on both here to see whether they show similar patterns and 
                                                        
1 The material on the OECD website also includes a valuable quality review; see OECD (2012).  
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support the same conclusions. For presentational purposes the paper 
concentrates on figures from LIS, but we note where the OECD data would lead 
to markedly different conclusions for a particular country or more broadly. We 
start our analysis around 1980 where possible, since neither source has many 
observations before that, but for many countries we have to start later – around 
the mid-1980s, 1990, or even later.2 We do not include middle-income countries 
that are in the LIS database but are not OECD members, and likewise we exclude 
countries that are OECD members but generally categorised as middle-income 
(Chile, Mexico, and Turkey). 
 
3.2 Measuring living standards 
Our central measure for living standards is equivalised disposable household 
income. The concept of disposable household income employed in the LIS and 
OECD databases is in principle the same, as are the components in terms of 
earnings, self-employment, capital income, and taxes and transfers, though there 
may be subtle differences in operationalization across countries or over time.3 
We divide income by the square root of household size to take differences in 
household size and composition into account (Buhmann et al., 1988). 
To capture trends in real incomes over time for the middle compared to 
other parts of the distribution a number of approaches can be adopted. Here we 
focus on how the median – the income level separating the top and bottom 
halves of the distribution – has evolved over time. (An alternative is to look at 
average income of those in the middle quintile of the distribution, which gives 
similar results). We use national consumer price indices (CPI) to deflate 
household income, and we convert all income to 2010 US dollars by applying 
                                                        
2 We have dropped a small number of observations in LIS where breaks in series have given rise 
to substantial changes in definitions or coverage, based on information provided about the 
underling data sources and patterns in the data, namely Austria 1987 and 1995, Germany 1981, 
1983, Netherlands 1983, 1987, 1990 and Switzerland 1982, 1992. We also do not use Israel 1979 
or Poland 1986 because comparable PPP information is not available. 
3 In using data from LIS we set negative disposable household incomes to zero but retain all 
households with zero disposable income, rather than dropping negatives or zero incomes as is 
sometimes the practice, and we do not apply top and bottom coding. For the OECD database it is 
not always clear whether top and bottom coding has been applied or how negative incomes have 
been treated, as noted in the OECD’s quality review on the database. 
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purchasing power parities (PPP) for actual individual consumption to household 
incomes, both sourced from OECD National Accounts.4  
 
3.3 Measuring income inequality 
To capture trends in income inequality, we focus first on the most widely 
used summary indicator, the Gini coefficient. The Gini is particularly sensitive to 
changes in the middle of the income distribution, which fits with our interest in 
the income of the middle. The Gini can be calculated from the micro-data in LIS 
and is among the measures included in the OECD Income Distribution Database.5  
 The household surveys on which both the LIS and OECD databases rely 
have difficulty capturing what is happening at the very top of the income 
distribution. To be able to incorporate this into the analysis we draw on the 
World Top Income Database, which has estimates for a range of countries of the 
income share going to the top 1%, based on data from the administration of 
income taxes together with the national accounts (see 
http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu). These have made possible the 
in-depth analysis of trends in top incomes over the last century or more (see e.g. 
Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; 2010; Atkinson et al., 2011; Alvaredo et al., 2013; 
Piketty, 2014). Data are only available for some OECD countries, and refer to the 
share of the top in taxable (before income tax and social insurance 
contributions) rather than disposable income and the tax unit rather than the 
household.6 While these are important limitations for our purposes, it is 
essential to capture what has been happening at the very top of the distribution 
in some form. 
 
  
                                                        
4 Households at different income levels may not be affected by price changes in the same way, as 
shown for example by Flower and Wales (2014) for the UK, but the absence of comparable data 
means we cannot take this into account. 
5 Among alternative summary inequality measures, the P90/P10 ratio is also available in the OECD 
database, so we derived it from LIS micro data as well, and it shows similar patterns to those we 
describe. 
6 Estimates on a post-tax basis have been produced in separate studies for a few countries.  
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4. The evolution of living standards at the middle 
We begin our examination of trends in real incomes at the middle by 
showing in Figure 1 the evolution of the median over time for the countries 
where we have data from LIS going back as far as about 1980. We see that there 
is very wide variation. For Norway real income growth was spectacular in 
international comparison, while at the other extreme the USA saw only a very 
modest increase, with the result that Norway’s median had risen above the US 
figure by 2010. In between those extremes, Spain, Sweden and the UK saw 
median income rise by about two-thirds, though with a sharp decline in Spain 
toward the end of the period. Canada and France saw much more modest 
growth, and Australia saw limited growth up to the early 2000s but then a very 
substantial pick-up.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of living standards of the middle: Real median 




For the countries where our earliest observation in LIS is about 1985 (not 
shown), there is also high variation in how living standards of the middle 
evolved: Ireland and Luxembourg achieved a doubling of median incomes over 
the course of 25 years, Italy and Denmark in contrast had aggregate rises of 
about 20%, and Finland doing considerably better but Germany doing worse. 
The four countries for which our first observation in LIS is about 1990 – all 
experiencing the upheaval of the post-communist transition – also display 
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striking differences: Hungary had a sharp initial decline in median income and a 
subsequent recovery sufficient only to bring the median back to about where it 
was in 1990 more than 2 decades later. Poland also saw a sharp initial decline, 
but the subsequent growth, notably from the mid-2000s, was strong enough to 
produce a substantial increase over the whole period. 
It is helpful in framing our discussion to categorise countries, using a set 
of (necessarily arbitrary) cut-offs, in terms of their average annual growth rate in 
median income, calculated over the longest period covered by the LIS data for 
the country in question. The length of time to which this average applies varies 
across countries, but it can be meaningfully related to the trend in inequality 
measured over the same period, to which we will come shortly. This produces 
the groupings shown in Table 1, from countries achieving average annual growth 
in median income of 2% or more down to those that saw little or no growth on 
average. The USA is in that bottom category, with median income growth 
averaging under 0.5%. 
  
Table 1: Average annual growth in median household income by country 
over the longest period covered in LIS back to 1980 
Average growth per year Country 
  
Very strong growth 
(2% or more) 




(1.6% < 2%) 
Belgium, Israel, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK  
  
Some growth  
(1%-1.5%) 
Australia, Finland, Netherlands 
  
Modest growth 
(0.5% < 1%) 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New 
Zealand, Switzerland 
  
Little or no growth 
(< 0.5%) 
Hungary, Iceland, USA, Japan 
Note: Japan and New Zealand based on OECD data. 
 
Does the OECD database present a similar picture of country rankings and 
groupings, on the basis of their average growth rates in the median for the 
longest period covered in the OECD database back to 1980? About half the 
countries covered in both sources fall into the same category, and some of the 
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others would move up or down only one category. For Ireland, Poland, and 
Spain, the OECD data shows much lower growth but covers only from 2004 
onward and includes 2011 and thus more of the impact of the Great Recession. 
For Luxembourg, the average growth rate in the OECD database is lower than in 
LIS despite covering much the same period, though it remains a good performer. 
For Greece the average growth rate in the OECD data is very much lower, but the 
OECD data covers from 1986 whereas LIS is from 1995. The OECD database also 
provides trend data for Japan and New Zealand, not included in LIS; they are in 
the bottom and second category respectively. 
In most countries median household income growth also varied 
substantially from one sub-period to another. This is clear from Figure 1 for the 
countries with the longest data coverage in LIS, and is also true of the other 
countries. This provides another source of variation in assessing how trends in 
real income for the middle may be related to those in income inequality, though 
the time-lags one might expect to operate are far from clear, as noted earlier. 
Countries also varied greatly in their median income at the beginning of 
the observation period. Some had already achieved high levels of income, while 
others started from low levels and had ample scope to catch up. As well as 
percentage growth rates, one may therefore want to also focus on the absolute 
increase in median income over time, which can be read off Figure 1. This does 
affect to some extent one’s perspective on how well or badly specific countries 
have done, but it is clear from Figure 1 that the USA’s performance is particularly 
poor by either standard.  
 
5. Trends in income inequality 
5.1 Overall inequality 
Turning to the distribution of incomes, we look first in Figure 2 at what 
happened to the Gini coefficient over time for the countries for which we have 
data in LIS beginning in about 1980 (left hand side) or 1990 (right hand side). 
The figure shows the initial level of the Gini, in the first year for which we have 
data, as well as the level in the latest observation in LIS. We see also see here that 
there is a wide variation in how the Gini changed over the past decades –
inequality has risen a good deal in some countries, but has not risen much, or 
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indeed has fallen, in some. So while inequality has increased in a clear majority, 
there is no uniform trend: country experiences vary widely. 
 
Figure 2: Long-term trends in the Gini coefficient 
 
Once again, it is helpful to categorise countries by the pace and nature of 
the change observed in the Gini coefficient in LIS, both to see whether the OECD 
data show a similar picture and then as a point of reference when considering 
how trends in real incomes may be related to those in inequality. For this 
purpose we use the following cut-offs for the annual average change in the Gini: 
more than 0.2 as representing a pronounced increase, between 0.1 and 0.2 as a 
substantial increase, between 0.05 and 0.1 as some increase, between -0.05 and 
0.05 as representing little or no change, and below -0.05 as a clear fall. Over a 
twenty-year period these annual averages would mean an increase of above 4 
points in the Gini, between 2 and 4, between 1 and 2, between -1 to +1, and 
below -1. On this basis LIS data leads to countries being grouped as shown in 
Table 2. We see countries with a pronounced increase in inequality including the 
USA and the UK, about which there has been much research and commentary, 
but also traditionally low-inequality Nordic country Finland (and Sweden is in 
the next grouping) as well as formerly state socialist and low-inequality 
countries like the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. At the other 
end of the spectrum, seven countries register a decline, three more little change, 
and a further four only a modest increase. What we can learn from this cross-
 12 
country perspective is that the widely-used broad summary that inequality has 
been increasing across most of the rich countries risks obscuring major 
differences in country experiences. 
 
Table 2: Trend in the Gini index by country over the longest period covered 
in LIS back to 1980 
Change in Gini  Country 
  
Pronounced increase  
(0.2 points or more per year) 
Belgium, Czech Rep, Israel, Finland, New Zealand, 
Poland, Slovak Rep, UK, USA 
 
  
Substantial increase  
(0.1 to 0.2 points per year) 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Sweden 
  
Some increase  
(0.05 to 0.1 points per year) 
Italy, Germany, Norway, Spain,  
 
  
No change  
(-0.05 to 0.05 points per year) 
Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands 
  
Fall  
(-0.05 points or below per year) 
Austria, Estonia, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Switzerland 
 
Note: Japan and New Zealand based on OECD data  
 
The OECD data again allow us to add Japan and New Zealand, both shown 
as experiencing marked increases in the Gini. However, comparing the two 
databases for the countries that are included in both reveals rather different 
patterns of change in the Gini coefficient over time for quite a few countries. 
Sometimes different periods are covered in the two sources – at the extreme for 
Belgium, for example, LIS data shows a very marked increase in the Gini but only 
covers 1985-2000, whereas the OECD data show a decline but relate to 2004-
2010. For some other countries – including Austria, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia – the two datasets overlap in the period covered 
but differ in their start or end-point and the categorisation in Table 2 would be 
affected. This reflects the important reality that, as Tóth (2014) emphasises, 
inequality may often rise (or fall) in discrete “episodes” rather than consistently 
over a lengthy period, most dramatically in the case of the countries 
experiencing transition from state socialism in the 1990s but also to a significant 
degree in other OECD countries (see also Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). This 
 13 
becomes clear when one moves from examination of the change in inequality 
over the entire period covered by LIS (or OECD) data to focus on sub-periods 
from one wave to the next, of (approximately) 5 years in length. For most 
countries, there is very substantial variation across these sub-periods in 
movements in the Gini; to give just a few examples, inequality grew rapidly in the 
UK in the 1980s but was stable from about 1995 and also increased much more 
rapidly in the USA before that date than after it, while Sweden saw some periods 
when inequality rose very rapidly and others where it fell. This means that the 
categorisation of countries in terms of changes in inequality will depend on the 
particular period examined, and the period that happens to be covered by the 
available data will influence perceptions and research findings.  
Even more problematically, though, there are a number of countries for 
which the OECD data cover the same period as LIS but show a different picture. 
For the Czech Republic LIS has a much greater increase in the Gini than the OECD 
database, whereas for Germany and Hungary the opposite is the case. For 
Denmark the Gini declines marginally in LIS whereas the OECD database shows a 
considerable increase, and for France LIS shows inequality declining 
substantially whereas the OECD suggests some increase. The factors underlying 
these divergences between the two datasets require and merit in-depth 
investigation. For present purposes, the central message is that available data 
sources capture changes in income inequality imperfectly, so the ranking of 
countries in terms of those trends has to be regarded as an approximation 
subject to error, with a particular question mark over the countries where the 
divergence is greatest.  
 
5.2 Top incomes 
For a subset of the OECD countries we are able to study trends in income 
shares at the very top of the income distribution. These data are available in the 
World Top Income Database. Figure 3 shows the share of total (gross) income 
going to the top 1% around 1980 and 2010. We see that the share going to the 
top has generally gone up over this period, but by a great deal more in some 
countries than in others. Atkinson and Piketty (2007) highlighted the fact that 
the English-speaking countries saw much larger increases than the continental 
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European countries for which estimates were available. Indeed, Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, the UK, and the USA all saw this share increase by 5 percentage 
points or more, and were the only OECD countries to do so (though New Zealand 
is the exception, with only a modest increase). Italy, Norway, and Portugal saw a 
lower but still substantial increase of 3 percentage points or more, while the 
share of the top 1% did not increase by that much in Finland, France, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
 
Figure 3: Long-term trends in top income shares 
 
 
Most of the English-speaking countries where top income shares rose 
particularly rapidly (namely Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA) also saw 
overall inequality rise markedly as can be seen from Table 2, but Ireland is a 
striking exception, where the share of the top 1% increased sharply but overall 
inequality actually declined. The opposite contrast can be seen in the case of 
Finland, Japan, New Zealand and Sweden, where top income shares did not rise 
sharply but overall inequality did. Italy and Norway saw substantial increases in 
both top income shares and overall inequality. France saw little increase in 
either, while the Netherlands and Spain saw little increase in top income share 
and some increase in overall inequality. So there is some consistency in terms of 
trends between the two indicators of inequality, but also some substantial 
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divergence: the two measures are positively but only weakly associated, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.21. This may arise for a variety of reasons: changes at 
the top may be missed in household surveys to a varying extent across countries 
and the Gini measure is in any case more sensitive to changes occurring around 
the middle than at either extreme of the distribution, so the Gini may mostly 
reflect inequality within the “bottom 99%”. Further, the differences in income 
concept and recipient unit already noted may also be important and merit 
investigation. For our current purposes, though each indicator contains valuable 
information about what has been happening to inequality. 
 
6. The evolution of living standards and inequality 
Having examined how median household incomes and income inequality 
have evolved over time across the OECD countries, we now bring these together 
to see how they are aligned. Has rapidly rising inequality been associated with 
stagnating real incomes around the middle? A comparison of the way countries 
are grouped in Table 1 versus Table 2 shows some such cases: Japan and the USA 
have had big increases in income inequality and slow median income growth, 
and rapid median income growth has accompanied little or no increase in overall 
inequality in Ireland and Greece. However, there are also counterexamples, 
including for example Belgium, the Czech Republic, and the UK, which (in LIS 
data) saw both median income and inequality rising rapidly, and Austria, 
Denmark and France which saw only modest real income growth with inequality 
stable or declining. Focusing on top incomes rather than the Gini would change 
the story for specific countries, but it would not change the overall conclusion.  
This can be assessed in more depth from Table 3, which ranks countries by their 
average annual median growth and brings that together with the annual average 
change in the Gini and in the top 1% share, each calculated over the longest 
period available in LIS. We see that the countries where median growth was the 
strongest include ones where the Gini and/or top income shares rose rapidly, 
but also ones where this was not the case, and vice versa. More broadly, the 
rankings by inequality change do not align closely with that by median income 
growth (see also Kenworthy 2013).  
 16 
Table 3: Evolution of ordinary living standards and inequality over the 
longest period covered in LIS back to 1980 
Country Years 




Average top 1% share 
change 
Ireland 1987-2010 3.188 -0.146 0.190 
Norway 1979-2010 2.383 0.081 0.091 
Sweden 1981-2005 1.897 0.167 0.096 
United Kingdom 1979-2010 1.738 0.239 0.214 
Spain 1980-2010 1.707 0.063 0.021 
Finland 1987-2010 1.421 0.246 0.047 
Netherlands 1993-2010 1.340 -0.026 0.071 
Australia 1981-2010 1.212 0.179 0.157 
Denmark 1987-2010 0.862 -0.012 0.051 
France 1978-2010 0.854 -0.084 0.010 
Italy 1986-2010 0.829 0.089 0.094 
Canada 1981-2010 0.723 0.111 0.178 
Switzerland 2000-2004 0.582 -0.442 -0.195 
Germany 1984-2010 0.547 0.088 0.178 
United States 1979-2013 0.327 0.210 0.280 
Estonia 2000-2010 6.148 -0.384 
 Czech Republic 1992-2010 2.843 0.281 
 Luxembourg 1985-2010 2.809 0.123 
 Slovak Republic 1992-2010 2.232 0.420 
 Greece 1995-2010 2.000 -0.117 
 Slovenia 1997-2010 1.957 0.179 
 Belgium 1985-2000 1.955 0.599 
 Israel 1986-2010 1.595 0.320 
 Poland 1992-2010 1.551 0.287 
 Austria 1994-2004 0.923 -0.133 
 New Zealand 1985-2011 0.778 0.200 
 Japan 1985-2009 0.060 0.130 
 Iceland 2004-2010 -0.184 -0.186 
 Hungary 1991-2012 -0.232 0.019 
 Note: Japan and New Zealand based on OECD data  
 
The UK and the USA provide a striking illustration of how countries that 
look similar in one of these dimensions performed very differently in the other. 
As the bottom part of Figure 4 shows, from around 1980 to 2010 the Gini 
increased by a comparable amount in the two countries, and both saw a rapid 
increase in the top 1% income share. By contrast, the top part of the Figure 
shows that growth in the median (and below the median) was much more 
substantial in the UK.  
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Figure 4: Growth of real disposable household income by decile and trends 
in inequality in the US and the UK 
 
 
In addition to overall changes over the entire period covered for each 
country, we can look at the relationship between median income growth and 
inequality employing all the available observations for intervening years. (In LIS 
most often these are at approximately 5-year intervals; for the small number of 
countries where some annual data are available, we only use selected years for 
consistency.) We then find that median income growth across the entire sample 
of countries and observations from LIS is negatively correlated with change in 
the Gini (-0.25) but actually has a (low) positive correlation with growth in top 
income shares (+0.12). To assess more fully whether the evolution in median 
household income is statistically associated with changes in income inequality, 
we estimate a simple OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the 
country level, with growth in the median as dependent variable and change in 
the Gini and the top 1% share entered separately and then together as 
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independent variables.7 As we have the top 1% variable only for a subset, we 
present the results for the Gini estimated with the full sample and that subset.  
 
Table 4: OLS regressions with median household income as the dependent 
variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Δ Gini -1.184* -0.700** 
 




(0.027) (0.076) (0.039)  (0.037) 
Δ Top 1% 
  
0.813 1.134   0.815 1.123 
   
(0.457) (0.297)   (0.443) (0.291) 
P50 (level)   -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
    (0.576) (0.740) (0.977) (0.830) 
Constant 1.637*** 1.341*** 1.179*** 1.213*** 2.156* 1.713 1.146 1.461 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.163) (0.278) (0.195) 
N 153 99 99 99 153 99 99 99 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.025 0.004 0.041 0.055 0.016 -0.007 0.032 
Note Dependent variable: average annual percentage growth rate of median equivalised disposable household 
income. OLS with clustered standard errors. Columns 1 and 3 are based on the full sample; 2 and 4 on the 
sample for which we have top income information.  
 
The results are in Table 4 consistently suggest a statistically significant 
negative association between median income growth and an increase in the Gini 
in the same period. This holds across the entire sample (column 1) and the 
subset for which the top 1% share is available (col. 2), and for the latter when 
the change in that share is included (col. 4). The change in top income share in 
the same period is itself not significant when entered alone (col. 3) or with the 
Gini (col. 4). The adjusted R2 for the equations is low, consistent with the low 
correlation between median growth and the change in inequality.  
An underlying tendency toward convergence in average or median 
incomes, whereby countries with initially lower incomes tend to grow relatively 
quickly and catch up, might complicate the relationship between change in the 
median and in inequality. To test and control for this, we add the level of the 
median at the beginning of the period as a right-hand-side variable. The results 
in columns 5-8 of Table 4 show that this variable is not significant and does not 
alter the other results. 
                                                        
7 Alternative estimation approaches such as system-GMM are problematic given the limited 
number of time periods per country. 
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So far we have sought to relate the change in median incomes to the 
change in inequality in the same period, but one could also argue that the initial 
level of inequality might also matter. Much of the discussion on the competing 
“grand narratives” mentioned earlier is unclear whether the postulated positive 
or negative effects of inequality relate more to it being at a high level or 
increasing rapidly. To examine this we generate an error correction model in 
Table 5, where we include the lagged level of both the dependent variable and 
the inequality indicators. The results do not change, and the lagged levels are not 
significant.  
 
Table 5: An error correction model for median household income 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 














Δ Top 1%   1.066 1.515 
 
  (0.330) (0.208) 
Top 1% (level)   -0.086 -0.192 
 
  (0.146) (0.138) 
P50 (level) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.572) (0.744) (0.462) (0.182) 
Constant 2.289 1.531 1.264 -0.632 
 
(0.166) (0.315) (0.213) (0.752) 
N 153 99 99 99 
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.006 -0.008 0.030 
 
As highlighted earlier, in debating the potential association between the 
evolution of median income and of inequality, the time lags that might be 
involved are also unclear. Is it the contemporaneous increase in inequality, or an 
increase in the previous period, or indeed further back, that we might expect to 
be associated with lower median income growth? In testing alternative lag 
structures we are severely limited by the number of time periods covered in the 
data, but Table 6 seeks to relate change in the median in each period to that in 
inequality in the previous period. No significant association is seen. Including 
both current and previous period change in the inequality measures leads to 
results similar to Table 4. 
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Table 6: Lagged growth 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 







Lagged Δ Top 1% 
  
0.992 0.765 
   
(0.142) (0.273) 
Constant 1.467*** 1.480*** 1.049*** 1.040*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 126 125 84 84 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.009 
 
7. Bringing in economic growth 
Our analysis so far has focused directly on the relationship between 
median household income and income inequality, without taking into account a 
key determinant of median income growth – growth in national output. 
Moreover, some of the causal stories embedded in the competing narratives 
whereby inequality may help or hinder median income growth operate 
significantly through their postulated effects on national income, while also 
relating to its distribution. In addition to looking directly at whether trends in 
median incomes are associated with those in inequality, it is therefore also 
important to bring growth in national income into our analysis. We do not seek 
to directly probe the impact of inequality on economic growth (Barro, 2000; 
Voitchovsky, 2005). Instead, we look at what happens when we add measures of 
the pattern of change in national income per person to our estimated models. 
 For this purpose we employ per capita gross national income (GNI). 
Unlike GDP, this excludes primary incomes payable to non-resident units but 
includes primary incomes receivable by residents from non-residents, which is 
more aligned to the sample coverage of household surveys. Data are from the 
OECD National Accounts, expressed in per capita terms using OECD population 
data and correcting for changes in price levels over time by applying the GDP 
deflator and by employing PPP adjustment for cross-country price differences in 
2010, so GNI per capita is expressed in 2010 international dollars.8 As context, 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of GNI per capita for the countries and years for 
which we have LIS median income data from around 1980 onward. Compared to 
                                                        
8 For US 2013 GNI per capita is not available. We use the trend in GDP per capita from 2012-2013 
to extrapolate it. 
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the trends in median real income, there is less variation across countries and 
over time, as can be seen by comparison with Figure 1 earlier. Furthermore, in 
terms of GNI per capita we see that the USA stands out as the richest country of 
the sample, which – as we saw earlier – is no longer the case for income at the 
median. 
 





Average annual percentage growth in GNI per capita in the countries and 
periods we are discussing is indeed correlated with annual percentage growth in 
median household income, but the correlation is only around 0.6. There is 
essentially no correlation between growth in GNI per capita and the evolution of 
overall inequality as captured by the Gini, though the correlation with 
contemporaneous growth in the top 1% share is 0.5 (see also Thewissen, 2014). 
When we add growth in GNI per capita as an explanatory variable to our initial 
regression model with the same-period changes in inequality as independent 
variables, we see first in Table 7 that economic growth is positively associated 
with median income growth in all model specifications, and its inclusion 
improves the explanatory power of the model substantially. With an estimated 
coefficient of about 0.7-0.8, increases in GNI per capita are substantially but not 
fully transmitted to middle-income households on average. A contemporaneous 
increase in overall inequality has a negative impact on median income growth 
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controlling for GNI change. In addition, the change in the top 1% income share 
also becomes negative and significant; so for a given change in per capita GNI, an 
increase in the share going to the top is associated with slower income growth at 
the middle (see also Kenworthy 2013).  
 
Table 7: OLS regressions with growth in median as the dependent variable, 
accounting for growth in GNI per capita 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% Growth GNI 
per capita 
0.714*** 0.684*** 0.708*** 0.676*** 0.838*** 0.812*** 










Δ Top 1% 
    
-1.793** -1.557** 
     
(0.020) (0.037) 
Constant 0.069 0.056 0.213 0.124 0.000 0.053 
 
(0.788) (0.812) (0.415) (0.575) (0.998) (0.754) 
N 153 99 153 99 99 99 
Adjusted R2 0.367 0.351 0.422 0.371 0.395 0.400 
Note Dependent variable: average annual percentage growth rate of median equivalised disposable household 
income. OLS with clustered standard errors. Columns 1, 3, and 5 are based on the full sample; 2, 4, and 6 on the 
sample for which we have top income information available.  
 
As before, we also estimated an error correction model specification 
where the levels of the dependent and independent variables at the start of the 
period are included, and this does not improve model fit or affect the significance 
of the coefficients. We also investigated whether the change in the independent 
variables in the previous period was important, and the lagged change in per 
capita GNI but not in the inequality measures was then significant. Among other 
sensitivity tests, using the percentage (rather than “absolute”) change in the 
inequality measures produced similar results, as did weighting the observations 
by the inverse Gini bootstrapped standard error. Separating out periods of 
positive from negative economic growth did affect the results: although we have 
only a small proportion of cases of the latter, when they are dropped the change 
in Gini is no longer statistically significant although the top 1% share remains so.  
Estimating the same models with data on the median and Gini from the 
OECD database rather than LIS is another important test of their robustness, 
from which the results are more mixed. For this purpose, to have the most 
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comparable results, we include the same set of countries and the time span for 
which we have LIS data. We again find that the change in GNI per capita is 
significant, though the coefficient is a good deal lower (at around 0.4). The 
change in the Gini is negative and significant (at the 10% significance level) 
when the top 1% share is included, while the top 1% itself is not significant. The 
fact that the two datasets show somewhat different relationships reinforces the 
point we emphasised earlier about the data on inequality trends and the care 
required in using them. 
It is also worth highlighting that even when economic growth is included 
in the estimated model, a significant part of the variation in median household 
income growth over time and across countries is left unexplained. Apart from the 
fact that rising national income going to households may benefit those at the top 
rather than in the middle, as evidenced by the growth of the capital income share 
in most rich countries, not all such income goes to households in the first place 
(Piketty and Zucman, 2014). Some of the economic growth measured through 
the national accounts accrues to other sectors, and even the proportion going to 
the household sector in national accounts terms will not be fully reflected in the 
incomes of households as captured in household surveys. The differences arise 
for both conceptual and measurement reasons: who and what is included differs 
in important respects, and some components of income are known to be 
underreported in household income surveys (Tormalehto, 2011). Making the 
analytical links in the chain going from overall economic growth to growth 
benefitting households is thus an important complement to understanding how 
the income that does reach households is distributed among them. It is 
encouraging that the OECD recently launched a project to produce data on 
incomes reaching the household sector compatible with the framework of the 
national accounts (Fesseau et al., 2013). Another difference is that economic 
growth is measured on a per capita basis, whereas our real income levels are 
calculated at the household level and equivalised to account for economies of 






The evolution of living standards of ordinary households has become a 
central concern as rich countries strive for inclusive growth and shared 
prosperity. By analysing the most satisfactory comparative data, this paper has 
brought out the widely varying experiences of OECD countries with respect to 
real income growth around the middle over the last two or three decades. 
Median income growth has been very much stronger in some countries than 
others, with some seeing average annual growth rates of 2% or more while 
others, including the United States, had the median grow by less than 0.5% per 
year. Over a twenty- to thirty-year period this yields very striking differences in 
how middle-income households have fared. The data also show that for most 
countries median income growth also varied a good deal from one sub-period to 
another.  
As far as income inequality is concerned, we find that while some increase 
in overall inequality – as reflected in the Gini coefficient – has been the most 
common experience among the OECD countries over the same decades, there has 
been very wide variation in the extent and timing of that increase, and some 
countries have seen little or none while others have seen rapid increases. Among 
the subset of OECD countries for which estimates of top income shares are 
available, most have seen increasing concentration of (pretax) income at the top, 
but the scale of that increase varies widely and is not always consistent with 
measured trends in overall inequality. So here too it is important not to lose sight 
of difference in the search for a common, consistent pattern and overarching 
story. Furthermore, available estimates of changes in inequality are subject to 
error and we saw that different sources and indicators do not always tell the 
same story, so caution is required in using these data, not least in studying their 
relationship with household income growth. 
The comparative time-series data employed here do not allow for an 
investigation of the complex channels and processes through which inequality 
levels and changes might influence middle income growth, but they do show that 
there have once again been widely varying experiences in how median incomes 
and inequality have evolved together. There are countries and sub-periods 
where the median stagnated and inequality rose rapidly, but also ones where 
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increasing inequality accompanied rapid growth in the median and others where 
the median rose only modestly while inequality was stable. The US case, where 
stagnating middle incomes accompanied rapidly rising inequality for much of the 
period covered by the data, is not representative of the experience of the rich 
countries over recent decades. A negative and statistically significant association 
between the change in the Gini coefficient and median income growth was found 
when we pooled the data from LIS across countries and sub-periods, but this 
accounted for only a very small proportion of the variation in median income 
growth. A significant negative relationship with changes in the top income share 
was found only when controlling for the change in gross national income per 
person: for a given level of overall growth, increasing shares at the very top went 
together with lower growth at the middle. Even including overall economic 
growth and inequality trends in the statistical model, a substantial part of the 
variation in income change for the middle remains unaccounted for. 
These findings have important implications for how one measures and 
monitors progress toward improving living standards for ordinary, middle-
income households. Promoting and tracking economic growth will clearly not 
suffice, as is now widely recognised, but the evidence presented here shows that 
monitoring the evolution of growth and inequality together will also fall short. 
Instead, if incomes around the middle (or toward the bottom) of the distribution 
are of central interest, these must be measured directly and integrated into 
headline indicators and policy impact tracking processes.  
From a substantive rather than measurement and monitoring 
perspective, our findings can only be suggestive, but they do suggest that neither 
of the polar “grand narratives” featuring so strongly in current debates – that 
high or rising inequality consistently boosts or reduces real income growth for 
the middle – is true to the variety of experiences actually observed across the 
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